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Case Notes

WARSAW CONVENTION-CARRIER LIABILITY-Mental Anguish and Distress Are Not Encompassed as a Matter of Law by
the Clause "Any Other Bodily Injury" Under Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention. Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 69

Misc.2d 642, 330 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 40 App.Div.2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (App.Div. 1972).
Infant plaintiff was a passenger on defendant's aircraft enroute
to New York from Tel Aviv when the plane was hijacked and
forced to land in the Jordanian desert.' Plaintiff alleged that she
suffered extreme fright, loss of weight and developed a skin rash
as a result of being held captive for several days in the desert.! A
bodily contact injury was not alleged. Plaintiff sought summary
judgment against the carrier on the theory that article 17' of the
Warsaw Convention and, in particular, the clause "or any other
bodily injury" included claims for mental anguish and distress. On
the basis of the French translation of the Convention, the New
York trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiff.! Defendant appealed. Held, reversed: A court cannot take cognizance
of the translation of a foreign language; these determinations are
issues of fact for the jury.' Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
'Herman v. TWA, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (App. Div. 1972).
I/d. at 829.
'Warsaw Convention, article 17, 49 Stat. 3018, T.S. 876 (1934) provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger, or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
" Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, 49 Stat. 3000 et seq., T.S. No. 876 (1934) [hereinafter
cited as Warsaw Convention or Convention].
Herman v. TWA, 330 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1972). The trial court noted
that the translation of the French text of article 17 connotated a broader meaning in English than simply a physical "hurt" or "injury." The French text included
words that when translated meant "damage," "prejudice," "wrong," or "hurt."
Id. at 832.
6 Defendant had also contended that plaintiff's injuries, if any, were not sustained while in flight, but while the plane was grounded. The lower court held
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69 Misc.2d 642, 330 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 40 App.Div.2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (App.
Div. 1972).
According to article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, a plaintiff
may recover from an air carrier if he or she suffers death, wounding, "or any other bodily injury"' while on board an aircraft during
a Warsaw flight.8 The Warsaw Convention, however, does not
that the accident which caused the alleged damage took place "on board the
aircraft" within the meaning of Warsaw Convention article 17, 49 Stat. 3018. On
appeal, the majority did not discuss this point. The dissent, however, devoted little
time in dismissing defendant's argument as not determinative of the question before the court. For purposes of this note, defendant's main contention that article
17 does not encompass mental distress will be dealt with exclusively. See generally
McClintock, Skyjacking: Its Domestic Civil and Criminal Ramifications, 39 J. Am
L. & COM. 29, 46-7 (1973).
'The Warsaw Convention was modified by the Montreal Agreement of 1966.
See CAB Agreement No. 18990, approved by Order No. E-23680 (May 13,
1966), reprinted in CAB, AERONAUTICAL STATUTES AND RELATED MATERIALS 425

(rev. ed. 1970). The Montreal Agreement of 1966 did not materially alter the
wording of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. For the purposes of this note,
it will be considered that either the wording of article 17 from the Warsaw Convention or Montreal Agreement will present the identical questions to the court.
'A Warsaw flight is described in the Warsaw Convention, article 1, 49 Stat.
3014-15, T.S. 876 (1934), as follows:
(I) This convention shall apply to all international transportation
of persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire. It shall
apply equally to gratuitous transportation by aircraft performed
by an air transportation enterprise.
(2) For the purposes of this convention the expression "international transportation" shall mean any transportation in which,
according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure
and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in
the transportation or a transshipment, are situated either within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory
of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping
place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another power, even though that power is not
a party to this convention. Transportation without such an agreed
stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same High Contracting Party
shall not be deemed to be international for the purposes of this
convention.
(3) Transportation to be performed by several successive air
carriers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this convention, to be
one undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties
as a single operation, whether it has been agreed upon under the
form of a single contract or of a series of contracts, and it shall
not lose its international character merely because one contract
or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely within a territory
subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the
same High Contracting Party.
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resolve the question whether and to what extent mental distress
and anguish are within the scope of "any other bodily injury."
Therefore, the court in Herman was faced with two questions of
first impression: (i) whether mental anguish was included within
the scope of article 17, and, if so, (ii) does there necessarily have
to be physical impact or manifestations accompanying the mental
anguish in order for a plaintiff to be able to pursue a remedy
against the carrier?
On appeal from the lower court's decision, plaintiff, noting that
the official French text of the Convention when translated into
English is broad enough to include mental distress and anguish,
urged that personal injuries caused by mental anguish are encompassed by article 17.' Defendant, however, denied liability contending that since the specific words of the Warsaw Convention's
official English translation of article 17 did not mention mental
distress, it could not be implied." The majority of the appellate
court reasoned that the resolution of the issue of the interpretation
of article 17 depended on which translation of the official French
text was adopted."' The interpretation of a foreign language, however, presents a triable issue of fact; therefore, New York courts
are prohibited from taking judicial cognizance of the meaning of
foreign languages." Consequently, the appellate court reversed the
decision of the lower trial court that had granted summary judgment for plaintiff."
The dissenting opinion in the appellate court, emphasizing the
common law duties and obligations that common carriers owe
their passengers,"' urged that the interpretation of the Convention
0

337 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (App. Div. 1972).

'1/d.

" See Block v. Compagnie Nationale
Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 330
(5th
Cir. 1967).
12 337 N.Y.S.2d at 828-29. See C. MCCORMICK'S, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 335 (2d ed. 1972); In re Tomljenovich's Will, 154 N.Y.S.2d 327,
331 (Sup. Ct. 1956). In Tomljenovich's Will, the court stated that: "It is not for
the court to take judicial cognizance of the meaning of foreign languages, for
such is a question of fact to be proved as any other fact." See also People v.
Yui Kui Chu, 273 N.Y. 191, 197, 7 N.E.2d 96, 98 (Ct. App. 1937); Hossbach
v. Behr, 39 App. Div. 793, 795, 124 N.Y.S. 379, 380 (App. Div. 1910).
sAccord, Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 App. Div.2d 963, 338
N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 1972).
4337 N.Y.S.2d at 830-31. See W. PROSSER, TH4E LAW OF TORTS §§ 34, 56
(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Prosser]; See also McPherson v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc., 383 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1967) (duty owed by carrier to passen-
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be consistent with these common law principles. For example, in
5 plaintiff passenger was inLetsos v. Chicago Transit Authority"
jured by another passenger. Plaintiff sued defendant bus company
alleging negligence on the part of the company for not preserving
order on the bus and for failing to take timely action to protect
him from harm caused by disorderly passengers."6 The court in
Letsos held that the carrier has a duty to transport its passengers
safely; this includes "the obligation of using due diligence to protect7
its passengers from assault, injury and abuse by third persons."'
Since there is no indication in the provision itself or applicable
case law whether an injury caused by fright is within the scope of
article 17, the dissent reasoned that applicable common law principles as expressed in Letsos and other cases involving common
carriers should be adopted. The dissent concluded that the air carrier should be held liable for the injury to plaintiff, and therefore,
the meaning of "bodily injury" in the English translation of the
Convention does include an action for mental distress and anguish."6
The majority in Herman left unanswered for the moment the
question of whether article 17 of the Warsaw Convention enables a
plaintiff to seek recovery for mental anguish. The determination
of what "any other bodily injury" in article 17 encompasses, however, can be ascertained by: (i) an examination of the history,
purposes and interpretation of the Convention, in particular article
17, as well as (ii) reviewing the development of present day tort
law in the area of mental anguish, both with and without accompanying physical manifestations.
The Supreme Court has held that treaties are to receive a fair
and liberal interpretation. 9 The courts are also bound to look
gers requires it to maintain order and prevent personal attacks); Pullman Co.

v. Culbreth, 2 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1924) (carrier responsible for protection of
passengers from injury); Green Bus Lines, Inc. v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp.,
287 N.Y. 309, 39 N.E.2d 251 (Ct. App. 1942) (common carrier has legal duty,

after due notice, to protect its passengers from assaults by fellow passengers).
McClintock, Skyjacking: Its Domestic Civil and Criminal Ramifications, 39 J.
AIR L. & COM. 29, 44 nn.63-64 (1973); Abramovsky, Compensation for Passengers of Hijacked Aircraft, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 339, 344 nn.30-37 (1972).
15 118 Ill. App.2d 26, 254 N.E.2d 645 (1969).
1' 254 N.E.2d at 646.
'I ld. at 647. See Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497
(1943).
1 337 N.Y.S.2d at 831.

191 KENT'S

COMMENTARIES

208 (14th ed. 1896); 5 J.

MOORE, DIGEST OF IN-
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beyond the form of the treaty to its history, the circumstances
attending the negotiation of the agreement and any other pertinent
information that might give a clue to the drafters' intentions." The
basic function of treaty interpretation is to ascertain the meaning
intended by the parties who created the treaty."2 When formulating
article 17, the drafters of the Convention did not reveal whether
they intended an injury caused by fright to be within the scope of
the provision.2" At the meeting of the Legal Committee of the
International Civil Aviation Organization that was convened in
Madrid, Spain in 1951, however, there was a discussion of the
type of personal injury that should be covered by article 17 of
the Convention. The delegates at the Conference finally determined
that they should not make a specific provision for mental injury
in the sense of emotional upset or disturbance unassociated with
bodily injury." The Conference did not, however, clearly indicate
whether article 17 encompassed mental anguish when accompanied
with bodily injury." It is interesting to note that Great Britain
adopted the Carriage By Air Act of 1932, that with minor changes
not here relevant, is identical in its text to the Warsaw Convention.
In referring to the term "bodily injury" contained in article 17 of
the Carriage By Air Act of 1932, British aviation experts concluded that the term "bodily injury is used to exclude other kinds
of injury caused by delay and will be widely construed to include,
TERNATIONAL LAw 249-53 (1906); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879).

See also Ware v. Hylton, 1 U.S. (3 Dall.) 164, 181 (1796), for the United States
Supreme Court's classic position toward treaties.
20Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940);

Valentine

v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931);
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 25 Sup. Ct. 662 (1905).
21 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 146
(1965), quoted in W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 174 (3d ed. 1971).
22 Beaumont, Need for Revision and Amplification of the Warsaw Convention,
16 J. Am L. & COM. 395, 402 (1949); Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the
Warsaw Convention, 26 J. AnR L. & COM. 323, 339-40 (1959).
22Excerpts from Report of the United States Delegation to Eighth Session of
the Legal Committee of ICAO, held at Madrid, Spain, Sept. 1951, 19 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 70, 79 (1952).
'The Committee did, however, vote to adopt the principles of the official

French text of article 17 of the existing Convention with one exception. The
Committee substituted the words "affection corporelle" for the words "lesions
corporelle" where the latter appeared in the official French text. The purpose of

this change was to insure that physical injury that was not necessarily associated
with a "rupture of bodily tissues" would be covered in the proposed amendments.

Id. at 79.
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for example, mental shock caused by the accident."' It has been

further suggested that the characterization of an injury as "bodily"
by the authors of article 17 does not necessarily eliminate cases
caused by fright since there is usually physical disability accompanying acute mental distress."6 This seems to lend support to a
conclusion that acute mental anguish accompanied by bodily injury
is within article 17. With the scarcity of available information

describing the intentions of the authors of article 17, however, it
is necessary to resort to past judicial interpretations of various
articles of the Convention to determine the scope of the article.
Although one of the basic objectives of the formulation of the
Warsaw Convention was to provide the fledgling air industry with
protection against unlimited tort liability by setting limits on the
air carriers' liability to passengers," courts have realized that the
successful airline industry of today does not need the extensive

protections that it once did. With this realization has come a continuous evolvement and broadening of the articles of the Convention through judicial interpretation to permit recovery when it had
previously been denied by strict and literal readings of the articles."
The New York courts have been in the mainstream of this trend."
z 1

P. KEENAN, A. LESTER, & P. MARTIN, SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT ON

AIR LAw

441, n.9 (3d ed. 1966). It should be noted that article 17 of the Warsaw

Convention is identical to article 17 of the Carriage By Air Act of 1932.
26 See Sullivan, The Codification of the Air Carrier Liability by International
Convention, 7 J. AIR L. 1, 19 (1936).
27 See Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Con-

vention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498-99 (1967). For a more complete description
of the history of the Warsaw Convention and subsequent related agreements, see
D. BILLYOU, Am LAW (2d ed. 1964); C. SHAWCROSS AND K. BEAUMONT, AIR
LAw (3d ed. 1969); Orr, The Warsaw Convention, 31 VA. L. REV. 423 (1945).
28 Compare Ross v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 190 Misc. 974, 77 N.Y.S.2d
257 (Sup. Ct. 1948), afi'd, 80 N.Y.S.2d 735 (App. Div. 1948), 85 N.E.2d 880
(Ct. App. 1949) where the court strictly interpreted article 3 of the Convention

with Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aerre Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) where articles 3 and 4 of the Convention were broadly interpreted in order
to allow the passenger plaintiff to circumvent the monetary limitations of the
Convention.
28Boryk v. Aerolineas Argentinas, 332 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)

(size

of type and form of notice in ticket not adequate); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aerre
Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (inadequate notice of articles
3 and 4 in passenger ticket); Stolk v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 58

Misc.2d 1008, 299 N.Y.S.2d 58, afJ'd, 64 Misc.2d 859, 316 N.Y.S.2d 455 (App.

T. 1970) (inadequate notice by articles 3 and 4); Egan v. Kollsman Instr. Corp.,

21 N.Y.2d 160, 234 N.E.2d 199, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1039 (1968) (non-compliance with article 3).
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For example, courts have given liberal interpretations to the words
"willful misconduct" found in article 25,"° "delivery" in article
3(2),' "place of business" in article 28(1)," and most recently,
"accident" in article 17.' In Eck v. United Arab Air Lines, Inc.,"
the Second Circuit, in interpreting article 28(1), stated:
The problem of interpretation ...should not ...[be] resolved by
a mechanical application of the ...provision's language. . . .A
court faced with this problem of interpretation ... can well begin
with an inquiry into the purpose of the provision. . . .The language of the provision.., should never become a 'verbal prison.'"
The Second Circuit further stated that the courts should "seek to
interpret the provision so as to effectuate its purpose, even if this
requires departing in some measure from the letter and reading
the language in a practical rather than literal fashion."'" In the
recent case of Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, Ltd.," the
federal district court held that a hijacking is within the ambit of
the term "accident" as it is used in article 17 of the Convention.
The federal district court conceded that "hijacking was probably not within the specific contemplation of the parties at the
time the Warsaw Convention was promulgated,"'" but nevertheless, found sufficient policy reasons underlying the Warsaw Con"Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d
Cir. 1965); LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.
1965); Grey v. American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955); Pekelis v.
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951); Wyman v.
Pan American World Airways, 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943),
afl'd, 267 App. Div. 947, 293 N.Y. 878, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1944), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 882 (1945).
"Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aerre Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), aff'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,
341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); Egan v. Kollsman Instr. Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 160, 234 N.E.2d 199, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968).
'2Eck v. United Arab Air Lines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966).
"3Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
'4360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966).
"Id. at 812. The Second Circuit also indicated that a court should look to
the conditions that existed when the provision was adopted, what the provision
was meant to control or remedy and the legislative history available to it when
interpreting a provision of the Warsaw Convention.
36Id.
37351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See 39 J. AIR L. & CoM. 445 (1973).
3'
Id. at 706.
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vention as well as an analogy between hijacking and sabotage to
hold that "hijacking" is within the meaning of "accident" in article 17."' Thus, there is precedent that the courts of the United
States have interpreted and applied various provisions of the Convention with little more than analogies and policy considerations
to lead them to a conclusion in a particular fact situation. All of
these cases have public policy overtones that cannot be ignored.
The limits on the amount of compensation a plaintiff may receive
in a Warsaw case have been increased due in part to the realization
that an injury to a passenger should not be solely a question of
who is right or wrong, but rather who can best bear or distribute
the loss."0 Airlines can distribute the loss as a cost of operation
and therefore have been recognized as being in a better position
to bear the loss for personal injuries to passengers. This assertion
was confirmed by the adoption of a standard of near absolute air
carrier liability for personal injuries occurring on a Warsaw flight
at the Montreal Convention of 1966. The adoption of a near
absolute presumption of liability against the air carrier underscores
the shift in emphasis from the protection of the air carriers by
Warsaw to a position of insuring compensation for passengers on
international flights thereby preventing the passengers from having
to bear the cost of injury or death. Thus, because of Montreal, the
burden of proof is shifted from the passenger and placed on the
carrier up to a specified monetary limit since the passenger does
not have to prove negligence on the part of the carrier for recovery.' This desire to protect the passenger on a Warsaw flight,
the recent trends in the relevant case law broadly interpreting articles of the Convention and traditional treaty interpretation guidelines adequately support a conclusion that mental distress and
anguish should be considered within the scope of "any other
9 d. at 707.

0 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 599 (1967).
41 By the Montreal Agreement the airlines agreed to increase the limit of
liability to $75,000. They further agreed to waive their defense of due care under
article 20 of the Warsaw Convention. Thus, the airlines became absolutely liable
for an injury under article 17 up to the $75,000 limit.
' To invoke the near absolute liability of the air carrier, the passenger must
establish that he was on a hijacked plane and that the alleged injury suffered was
within the scope of article 17. See Ambramovsky, Compensation for Passengers
of Hijacked Aircraft, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 339 (1972).
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bodily injury" of article 17.' Assuming that article 17 includes

mental distress, a secondary determination that must be made is:
does article 17 encompass only mental distress when accompanied
by physical impact and manifestations or are damages manifested
only by mental anguish also within its scope?
The trend in New York and a majority of other jurisdictions"
has been to permit recovery for mental anguish and distress with-

out impact, especially when accompanied by physical manifestations. It is logical that those cases of alleged mental distress that
result in physical manifestations, e.g., loss of weight and skin rash,
should be interpreted by the courts as being within the scope of
article 17. For example, in American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulenj the

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia indicated that the
Warsaw Convention permits recovery for mental anguish when
accompanied by physical manifestations." The court in Herman
did not refer to the Ulen decision; instead the appellate court emphasized the non-Warsaw case of Battalla v. State."7 In Battalla,
"It is interesting to note that the 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City to amend
the Warsaw Convention has changed the wording of article 17 from "or any
other bodily injury" to "personal injury." This would tend to indicate a realization on the part of the delegates to the conference that this wording in article 17
needed to be clarified and that the proposed change would disspell any argument
against the proposition that article 17 does include an action for mental anguish.
ICAO Doc. No. 8932 (1971). See also Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City to FurtherAmend the 1929 Warsaw Convention, 38 J. Am L. & COM.
519 (1972); 5 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLITICS 313 (1972).
"McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1, 16 n.43 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as McNiece]; Comment, Bystander
Recovery for Mental Distress, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 429 (1969); see Ferrara v.
Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252 (Ct. App.
1958) (where it was stated that "freedom from mental disturbance is . . . a protected interest ..
"); Easton v. United Trade School Contracting Co., 173 Cal.
199, 159 P. 597 (1916); see also Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill.2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157
(1961); Prosser § 54.
- 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
"The Court of Appeals in Ulen stated:
Plaintiff is entitled to recover such sum of money as . . . will fairly
and reasonably and adequately compensate her for the physical
injuries and the disabilities which she sustained by reason of this
accident, together with pain and suffering and anguish which she has
endured, as well as the mental and nervous shock and any and all
permanent injuries which you might find either physically or to her
mental and nervous system.
This extract does not appear in the reported opinion of the court, but in the version reproduced in ICAO Cases on the Warsaw Convention (1929.1955), ICAO
Doc. 36, § 2, at 87 (1955).
47 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (Ct. App. 1961).
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infant plaintiff alleged severe emotional and neurological disturbances because an employee of the State of New York failed to
properly secure a belt around plaintiff that was intended to protect
passengers from falling out of a chair lift." As a result of the alleged
negligent action, plaintiff became frightened and hysterical upon
descent of the lift and suffered "severe emotional and neurological
disturbances with residual physical manifestations."" In its decision, the New York Court of Appeals abandoned the impact doctrine"° that had required a physical touching of a person before an
action could be brought alleging mental anguish." Therefore, according to the Battalla rationale, the absence of physical contact
does not foreclose the possibility of recovery for mental distress
in the State of New York."
The majority in Herman distinguished Battalla and refused to
apply its reasoning in a situation controlled by the Warsaw Convention.' The dissent in Herman, however, recognizing the strong
trend in American case law toward allowing recovery for emotional and mental anguish when accompanied by physical manifestations of the disturbance," analogized plaintiff's loss of weight
41 176 N.E.2d at 729.

- Id.
"0 See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) that was
overruled by Battalla. The court in Battalla worried about a great number of
spurious actions being initiated; however, it suggested that the courts and juries
would be able to distinguish between a spurious claim and an honest one. Also,
the court indicated that the possibility of a successful spurious action does not
outweigh the injustice that would occur if the passenger who, through no fault
of his own, incurred serious physical damage, yet was not permitted to recover.
176 N.E.2d at 730-32.
11The bodily contact requirement was originally designed to guarantee that
plaintiff had a good reason to suffer mental anguish and shock. It has been called
a child of administrative expediency rather than a product of logical deduction
from principles of tort law. Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease:
Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. RaV. 193, 232 (1944). See also
Comment, Bystander Recovery for Mental Distress, 37 FORDRAM L. REv. 429,
432-33 (1969).
12 With this decision, New York joined the majority of states, England and
Scotland in allowing damages for emotional disturbances without impact. McNiece at 16 n.43. For a list of those jurisdictions that still require impact before
recovery can be considered for emotional disturbances see McNiece at 14 n.40.
England rejected the impact rule with the case of Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901]
2 K.B. 699, while Scotland disposed of the impact doctrine with the case of Gilligan v. Robb, Sess. Cas. 856, 47 Scot. L.R. 733 (1910).
53337 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
" See note 44 supra. See also Prosser § 54.
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and skin rash to Battalla5 Therefore, the dissent urged a liberal
interpretation of article 17 in order to accomodate the rationale of
Battalla that in turn would keep the Convention relevant and in
tune with present day tort law. It is further noted that the impact
doctrine is quickly losing favor and is destined for extinction.'
Thus, those courts that still deny a remedy in cases involving
mental disturbances accompanied by physical injuries are in the
minority."7 The same is not true, however, in cases that involve
mental disturbances with no physical manifestations.
It is still generally agreed that mental disturbance alone, without
accompanying physical injury or consequences, will not qualify a
person to recover for an alleged mental injury." This has been
explained by the fact that the ordinary case of temporary emotion
or fright that does not cause physical harm is too trivial and can
easily be fabricated." Therefore, most courts do not protect the
person from mental anguish without accompanying physical manifestation unless there is an element of extreme outrage and/or
moral blame present that guarantees the genuineness and seriousness of the distress and thus guards against spurious actions." In
Battalla, for example, the court reasoned that the possible spurious
actions for alleged mental distress with or without physical manifestations could be controlled by looking at the quality and genuineness of proof, the sophistication of the expert medical testi"337 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
"Prosser at 332-33. Professor Prosser notes the vast majority of jurisdictions
are following the trend of allowing actions for mental distress without the impact
requirement and observes that the impact rule may never be applied again. Id.
at 332.

"See note 44 supra.
"Amdursky, The Interest in Mental Tranquility, 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 339,
347 n.64 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Amdursky]; McNiece at 16-17, and n.45 for
representative cases. It has, however, been stated that the physical manifestation
test should be rejected since it is a medical fact that all severe emotional dis-

turbances have physical consequences. Neurological, enzymatic, and hormonal
changes occur in the body which are clinically measurable. Goodrich, Emotional
Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497 (1922); Smith, Relation
of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA.
L. REV. 193, 213 (1944).
"'See McNiece at 30-31; Prosser at 329.
"CAmdursky at 345. See also Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV.
40, 44-45 (1956); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New
Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 878 (1939). See McNiece at 16-17, and n.46 for
representative cases. See also Note, 18 S.D. L. REV. 251 (1973); Papieves v.
Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373, 263 A.2d 118 (1970); Prosser at 330.
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mony and the ability of the court and jury to recognize dishonest
claims. 1 The court in Herman did not specifically deal with the
problem of potential spurious claims if article 17 was interpreted
broadly. It appears, however, that when the circumstances are

such that a claim is not likely spurious and the mental distress is
real and serious, there is no substantial reason to deny recovery."'
Cases that allow recovery for mental anguish alone will nevertheless be rare and totally dependent on circumstances that unmistakingly indicate that a wrong has been committed.
The New York courts have not been hesitant to interpret and
apply the various articles of the Warsaw Convention when a ques-

tion has arisen concerning the scope of a particular provision."
Even without the French translation"4 of the text of article 17, the

appellate court had sufficient case law precedent to decide that
"any other bodily injury" encompasses a complaint for mental
distress and anguish, especially when accompanied by physical
manifestations. In Herman, however, the court forestalled this determination. The majority's decision ignores the recent trend giving liberal interpretations to the Convention's provisions as well
as the common law trend of allowing plaintiffs to recover for
01 176 N.E.2d at 731-32. The dissent in Battalla, however, disagreed with the
majority's faith in juries and courts eliminating spurious actions. The dissent cited
a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case that said to allow mental distress actions would "open a Pandora's box." Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 168, 142
A.2d 263, 266 (1958). See also Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 351
F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) where the district court in dicta stated that it had
"difficulty reading the Warsaw Convention to permit recovery for mental anguish
and suffering alone." Id. at 708. But see McNiece at 31, where the author notes
that the "flood of litigation argument" is not valid since the reverse has thus far
proven to be true.
62Amdursky at 352-53; Comment, Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional
Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. CHi. L. REv. 512
(1968). One expert in legal medicine has concluded that at one time the possibility and danger of a plaintiff faking an emotional injury was real, but today,
with increased medical knowledge and methods of testing a plaintiff, this phenomenon is most unlikely. Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis, and the Law, 6 CLEV. MAR. L. REV. 428, 435 (1957). See also Smith
and Hubbard, Doing Scientific Justice: Psychological Reactions to Traumatic
Stimuli, 1962 ILL. L. F. 190, 199, where the authors state that acute mental
"anxiety can actually kill."
3 See cases cited notes 29-33 supra. See also Molitch v. Irish Int. Airlines,
436 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1970) (interpreting article 29); Parke, Davis and Co. v.
British Overseas Airways Corp., 11 Misc.2d 811, 170 N.Y.S.2d 385 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1958) (interpreting article 26).
"See note 5 supra.
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mental distress and anguish when physical manifestations are
present. If a court does interpret article 17 as excluding all claims
for mental distress, then an action readily cognizable in the majority of American jurisdictions would be denied under Warsaw.
This would result in plaintiffs having no forum to present claims
and seek remedies for mental anguish suffered on board an aircraft
during a Warsaw flight. Therefore, a strict and narrow reading of
article 17 should be avoided; instead, a more rational and functional approach recognizing the passenger's need to be compensated for mental injuries and the carrier's ability to compensate
should be adopted.
Edward 0. Coultas

WARSAW CONVENTION-CARRIER LIABILITY-A Hijacking Is Within the Ambit of the Term "Accident", and Is Sufficient
to Raise the Presumption of Liability Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, LTD.,
351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Plaintiff was a passenger aboard defendant's aircraft scheduled
for a direct flight from Zurich, Switzerland to New York. The
aircraft was hijacked by members of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine and was forced to land on an airstrip in
the Jordanian desert. Plaintiff was detained by the hijackers for
five days. Plaintiff's complaint against the defendant-airline alleged two causes of action based on breach of contract by defendant and the negligence of defendant or its agents in causing
her bodily injury and mental anguish, and raised the presumption
of negligence created by the Warsaw Convention as modified by
the Montreal Agreement.' Defendant-airline moved for summary
'Warsaw Convention, Oct. 29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934), T.S. No. 876
(effective date Oct. 12, 1929). For a thorough discussion of the Convention, see
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80

HARv. L. REV. 497 (1967). Note that the Warsaw Convention does not create
a cause of action; rather, it creates a presumption of liability. Local law must
grant the cause of action. See, e.g., Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247

F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
2 Special Meeting on Limits for Passengers Under the Warsaw Convention
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judgment, maintaining that its liability was governed exclusively
by the Warsaw Convention as modified by the Montreal Agreement and that its liability could arise only upon proof of an
"accident" within the intendment of the Convention, hijacking not
being included in the term "accident." Held, dismissed: A hijacking
is within the ambit of the term "accident" and is sufficient to raise
the presumption of liability under article 17 of the Warsaw Convention as modified by the Montreal Agreement. Husserl v. Swiss
Air Transport Company, LTD., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
The purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to create uniformity in dealing with passengers and airlines engaged in international
air travel and to limit the liability of international air carriers for
accidental injuries sustained by passengers Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention created a presumption of liability on the part
of an international carrier "in the event of the death or wounding
of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger."
The terms of article 22, however, expressly limited the carrier's
liability to 125,000 francs, or about eighty-three hundred dollars.
Only by proving that the carrier's "wilful misconduct" caused the
damage complained of could a passenger or his personal representative recover more than the limit imposed by article 22.' Dissatisfaction by the United States with the low limits of recovery
under the Warsaw Convention prompted its refusal to ratify the
Hague Protocol that increased maximum carrier liability to $16,600, and ultimately, to give notice of its denunciation of the
Convention.! The United States withdrew notice of denunciation,
however, following the formulation of the Montreal Agreement!
Montreal modified the Warsaw Convention by providing for absoand the Hague Protocol, Feb. 1-15, 1966, Montreal, Canada, ICAO Doc.
8584-LC/154-1 & ICAO Doc. 8584-LC/154-2. [hereinafter cited as Montreal
Agreement].
'Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, 80 HARv. L. REV. at 498-99. For the contrary
view, that the Convention benefits only commercial airlines, see Kennelly, Problems Regarding Aviation Litigation, 20 DEPAUL L. REV. 436 (1971); and Kennelly, Response to Comments on Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airways, 58 ILL.
BAR J. 454 (1970).

" Warsaw Convention, article 25(1).
'53 Dep't State Bull. 924 (1965).
CAB Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
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lute liability' on the part of the carrier in case of death or injury
to a passenger and by increasing the maximum limit of recovery
to seventy-five thousand dollars for international flights originating,
terminating or stopping in the United States
The issue of whether the Warsaw Convention as modified by
the Montreal Agreement applied in a hijacking situation was a
question of first impression for the federal district court in Husserl.
In Husserl the court noted that the Convention did not "exclusively
regulate" the passenger-carrier relationship on international flights,'
but that it did create a presumption of liability "in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger, or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger."'" Plaintiff has the burden to establish
that there was an "accident" within the meaning of article 17 before the Convention can be invoked." Lacking case law precedent,
the federal district court construed the term "accident" to include
hijacking, a seemingly intentional act.
Although conceding that "hijacking was probably not within
the specific contemplation of the parties at the time the Warsaw
Convention was promulgated,"'" the federal district court, looking
to the subsequent conduct of the parties for guidance in interpretation," found that the Montreal Agreement resolved any doubts
about construction of the word "accident." This construction is
based on an analogy between sabotage (as contemplated by the
Montreal Agreement) and hijacking. The foundation of the analogy
is threefold: first, the Agreement imposes a system of absolute
liability upon the carrier; second, the tariff filed pursuant to the
Agreement, as interpreted by the Civil Aeronautics Board,"' conSee note 24 infra and text accompanying.
'31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).

'Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, LTD., 351 F. Supp. 702, 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
")Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so

sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking. (emphasis added)

"MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (lst Cir. 1971).
"2351 F. Supp. at 706.

IsId. at 707.
14 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966); 54 Dep't State Bull. 955 (1966). For the efficacy
of public statements in this regard by the CAB and the Department of State, see
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tains a proviso to the effect that saboteurs cannot recover under
the Agreement from carriers; and third, by inference, "innocent victims of willful acts of others are able to recover from the carrier,
even in respect to acts of sabotage to the aircraft."" Hence, by
analogy, if innocent victims of sabotage can recover, so can innocent victims of a hijacking, it being the intent of the parties at
Montreal to render carriers liable to innocent victims of these
intentional acts."0 The court in Husserl bolsters its construction of
the word "accident," with the "policy underpinnings of the Warsaw Convention"" as modified; i.e. the carrier is best qualified to
detect hijackers and avoid these incidents; the carrier can better
assess and insure against the risk; and the carrier can efficiently
distribute the costs of hijacking detection, prevention and insurance.
That a hijacking can be characterized as an accident seems to
be a contradiction. An accident is generally thought of as an
occurrence without design,"8 the very antithesis of a volitional criminal act like hijacking." Despite the attractive logic of the proposition that a hijacking is an intentional act and cannot be an
accident, the district court's finding that hijacking is "within the
ambit of the term 'accident' "" may be justified on'several grounds.
First, the analogy drawn by the court in Husserl between sabotage and hijacking is sound. Notwithstanding the "paucity" of reported cases on liability problems arising from bombings on board
aircraft," sabotage has come to be defined in general terms as
"willful, malicious, and intentional acts of force and violence or
unlawful methods of terrorism.., calculated to endanger physical
property and the lives of persons who are in or upon such property."'2 Substantially the same language has been applied to hijacking.' That an airline may not be responsible in fact for the actions
L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 12A.02 (1971) at 3 [hereinafter cited
as KREINDLER], cited approvingly by the court. 351 F. Supp. at 706 n.3.
1351 F. Supp. at 707.
16Id.
17Id.

(1967).
"'351 F. Supp. at 707.
20 Id.
"KREINDLER, S 3.12[5].
"47 AM. JUR. SEDITION, SABOTAGE § 3 (1963).
2"The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 902(i), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i)(2) (Supp.
"1THE RANDOM HOUSE AMERICAN DICTIONARY
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of a saboteur or hijacker, is of course not an issue in Husserl since
under ordinary circumstances an airline cannot be held liable,
absent fault, for acts of sabotage.' Swiss Air is held absolutely
liable to passengers who have suffered "death or wounding ... or
any other bodily injury"'" by virtue of the Montreal Agreement,
subject to the $75,000 recovery limitation of article 22(1)."
Moreover, the United States was greatly concerned that the Montreal Agreement inure to the benefit of innocent victims of international aircraft mishaps. Opposition in the United States to the
Montreal Agreement centered around the possibility that saboteurs
would be encouraged by the absolute liability provisions of Montreal. A Swedish proposal to provide for absolute liability, except
in case of sabotage, was ultimately rejected, however, on the ground
that innocent victims of sabotage should be compensated for their
losses.' The CAB and the Department of State sought to make
it clear that saboteurs, or those claiming on their behalf, could not
profit under the Montreal modification of the Warsaw Conven28

tion.
Secondly, the definition of an "accident" in legal terms may not
coincide with the meaning of that word in common usage. The
Federal Aviation Act's Economic Regulations define an aircraft
accident as
... an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft
which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft
with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have
disembarked, in which any person suffers death or serious injury
as a result of being in or upon the aircraft or by direct contact
with the aircraft or anything attached thereto, or the aircraft receives substantial damage.2
1971) defines "air piracy," or hijacking as ... any seizure or exercise of control,
by force or violence or threat of force or violence and with wrongful intent,
of any aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States."
2KREINDLER, § 3.12[5].
2See
note 10 supra.

21 If ratified, the Guatemala Protocol would increase the liability to one hundred thousand dollars and provide for additional future increases. Protocol to

Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Inter-

national Carriers by Air, March 8, 1971, Guatemala City, Guatemala. ICAO Doc.
8932. See generally Abramovsky, Compensation for Passengers of Hijacked Air-

craft, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 339 (1972).
'Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, 80 HAtv. L.

REV.

at 593-96.

2831 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966); 54 Dep't State Bull. at 956.
9 32 Fed. Reg. 20771 (1968).
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This definition of "accident" is sufficiently broad to encompass
that envisioned by the court in Husserl, since hijacking may be
included as an "occurrence associated with the operation of an
aircraft." The only reported case purporting to deal with the
definition of an accident within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, MacDonald v. Air Canada,° involved a plaintiff who was
injured by a fall while awaiting her suitcase in the baggage area
of the airport after disembarking from an international flight. The
First Circuit Court of Appeals found that plaintiff failed to sustain
the burden of proof that there was an accident, since on the facts it
was as reasonable to suppose that some internal condition caused
plaintiff's fall as that the fall was a result of an accident. Noting
that the Warsaw Convention is not applicable to mishaps that are
far removed from the operation of the aircraft, the Court of Appeals
failed to limit the parameters of the term "accident." It concluded
that "without determining where the exact line occurs, it had been
crossed in the case at bar."'" In Herman v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.," the argument was made, and rejected by the New York trial
court," that the infant plaintiff's injuries were not sustained during
an in-flight accident, but while the plane was grounded and detained in the desert by'hijackers. The New York court viewed the
detention after flight, not as an occurrence far removed from the
flight, but as one continuing hijacking within the meaning of
article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.'
Finally, dictum in Herman supports the Husserl ruling that
hijacking is within the ambit of the term "accident" under the
modified Warsaw Convention. The precise issue in Herman was
whether the article 17 use of the phrase "bodily injury" included
mental anguish. Defendant-airline conceded that it would have
been liable under the Montreal modification if the hijackers had
physically injured the plaintiff.' The New York trial court equated
hijacking and accident by noting "that the accident (hijacking)"
F.2d 1402 (Ist Cir. 1971).
at 1405.
Misc.2d 642, 330 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1972), rev'd on other grounds,

80439
81

Id.

3269

40 App.2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1972).
"1Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 69 Misc.2d 642, 330 N.Y.S.2d 829
(Sup. Ct. 1972).
4

3

1d.

38

Id. at 830.
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caused the damage sustained by plaintiff."
The federal district court in Husserl did, however, miss a rare
opportunity to bolster its decision with more convincing authority.
Defendant argued vigorously that an intentional act could not be
an accident and that the proposed amendment to the Warsaw
Convention, known as the Guatemala City Protocol, would bear
out this logic by substituting the word "event" for "accident" in
article 17.' If there is any doubt that hijacking or sabotage was
contemplated by the Montreal Agreement, there can be no misunderstanding of the position of the United States Government on
that subject as it concerns the Guatemala City Protocol:
The United States believes that the only exception to the rule of
absolute liability should be in case of contributory negligence
(including deliberate wilful acts). This exception would relieve the
carrier of liability only to the person responsible or those claiming
through him. The United States would oppose relieving carriers
of liability in situations of war risk, hijacking, or sabotage."
Ratification by the United States of the Guatemala City Protocol
would render the construction of "accident" in Husserl moot.
The impact that Husserl will have on actions brought pursuant
to article 17 of the Warsaw Convention will be far-reaching. The
construction of the word "accident" by the court in Husserl presents the innocent victim of a hijacked aircraft, governed by the
modified Warsaw Convention, with several alternatives. He can
prove that his injuries are the result of the hijacking and recover
the maximum seventy-five thousand dollar limit, or he can attempt
to prove that the carrier's willful misconduct caused his injury and
"Id. at 832-33.
" 351 F. Supp. at 706. The Guatemala City Protocol would amend article 17
of the Warsaw Convention to provide, in part, as follows:
1. The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or
personal injury of a passenger upon condition only that the event
which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft
or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier is not liable if the death or injury
resulted solely from the state of health of the passenger.
"Subcommittee on Revision of the Warsaw Convention as Amended by the
Hague Protocol, September 2-22, 1969, Montreal, Canada, ICAO Doc. 8839LC/158-l, at 293. See also Boyle, The Warsaw Convention, VIII FORUM 268,
269-72; and Fitzgerald, The Guatemala City Protocol to Amend the Warsaw
Convention, IX CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (1971).
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possibly recover in excess of seventy-five thousand dollars.' The
more resolute passenger-victim will plead alternatively for recovery
under both theories." There should be no dearth of cases to arise
out of hijackings of international flights covered by the modified
Warsaw Convention,' particularly if recovery for mental distress is
eventually allowed by the courts. ' Prior to the Montreal modification of the Warsaw Convention, a defendant carrier was allowed to
rebut the presumption of liability by proof that it and its agents had
taken all necessary measures to avoid damage or that it was impossible to have taken these measures, ' or by proof that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent." It was at least theoretically possible
to argue that the airlines had, by use of sophisticated and expensive
screening and detection devices, done all that was humanly possible to prevent hijacking. But the Warsaw Convention defenses,
except for that of contributory negligence, are waived by the terms
of the Montreal Agreement and the carrier is presumed to be
absolutely liable for aircraft accidents.' The argument has been
made that the threat of awards of substantial damages may provide
an incentive for airlines to protect the lives of their passengers -Husserl may be the impetus for testing that hypothesis.
William D. Wiles, III

"See

note 4 supra and text accompanying.

"Abraham Harari-Raful v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

-

Misc. 2d

-,

-

N.Y.S.2d __, 12 CCH Avi. L. Rep. 17,803 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
4'See Note, 36 MODERN LAW REVIEW 303, 306 at n.20.

"Although the Appellate Division in Herman reversed the decision of the
New York Supreme Court to allow a plaintiff to recover for mental distress under
the Warsaw Convention as modified, the issue has not yet been laid to rest, as

is evidenced by the dictum in Husserl. 351 F. Supp. at 708. Herman was reversed
on a technical point of construction; the trial court was held to have impermissibly taken judicial cognizance of the meaning of "bodily injury" in a foreign
language, this being a triable issue of fact. See Note, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 433
(1973).
41Warsaw Convention, article 20(1).
"Warsaw Convention, article 21. This defense was not waived under the
Montreal Agreement. See note 7 supra.
Id.
4See Abramovsky, 21 BUFFALO L. Rav. at 359.
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AIR CARRIERS-ANTI-TRUST IMMUNITY-The Power of the
Civil Aeronautics Board to Immunize from Anti-trust Liability
is Limited by the Definition of "Air Carrier" in the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958. Breen Air Freight, Ltd. v. Air Cargo,
Inc., 470 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932
(1973).
Air Cargo, Inc. (ACI)' and Ryder System, Inc. executed an
agreement creating a new corporation, Ryd-Air Inc.,' to furnish
air freight cartage and terminal services in metropolitan New
York City.' Simultaneously, ACI and Ryd-Air executed a contract
whereby Ryd-Air obtained the exclusive right to provide these
services for ACI in New York City.' Prior to the Ryd-Air contract,
Breen Air Freight, Ltd. and Mercury Air Freight, Inc. had provided cartage services under contracts with ACI.' When ACI refused to renew these contracts, awarding instead the exclusive
contract to Ryd-Air, Breen and Mercury instituted an action in
the Southern District of New York alleging antitrust violations and
seeking treble damages. Defendants moved to stay the antitrust
proceeding pending administrative action by the Civil Aeronautics
'ACI was created in 1941 as a joint research venture by seventeen certified
airlines, but became inactive upon completion of its research in 1944. In 1947,
the airlines reactivated ACI to provide, either directly or by contract, air freight
terminal and cartage services for the airlines in New York and other cities. The
reactivation agreement, known as CAB Agreement No. 1041, was submitted to
and approved by the CAB. See CAB Order No. E-1083 (Dec. 31, 1947).
'Ryd-Air was nominally a subsidiary of Ryder System, although ACI took a
twenty per cent stock interest and retained the right to appoint two of five directors. Breen Air Freight, Ltd. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 470 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973).
'At the time of this lawsuit in 1973, ACI was also operating in Boston, Chi-

cago, Los Angeles, and Cleveland.
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892 (Summer

1972). This suit, however, only concerned ACI's New York operations.
' Neither the contract nor the agreement was filed with or explicitly approved
by the CAB, although defendants argued that the Board's approval of the 1947
reactivation agreement extended to the Ryd-Air agreement. This contention was
rejected by the Second Circuit. As a condition to its approval of the 1947 agreement, the CAB stipulated that ACI file with the Board any of its contracts and
agreements that the CAB's Economic Bureau should declare were subject to CAB
approval. The filing requirement was removed prior to the making of the RydAir agreement in 1970. It appeared from the evidence, however, that some 200
ACI cartage contracts had been filed and approved by the time the filing requirement was removed in March of 1962. 470 F.2d at 770.
1 Breen had provided contract cartage services for ACI since 1967 and Mercury had done so since 1948. Id.
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Board (CAB), contending that primary jurisdiction was vested in
the administrative agency. The motion was denied, the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction being inapplicable.' Held, affirmed: The agreements in question were not executed by "air carriers" within the
meaning of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.' Consequently, the
CAB lacked authority to immunize the contracting parties from
anti-trust liability Breen Air Freight,Ltd. v. Cargo, Inc., 470 F.2d
767 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973).
The CAB has the power to relieve "air carriers" and other persons from the operation of the anti-trust laws when the actions of
these persons or "air carriers"' are found to be in the public interest
with respect to air transportation. Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act of 19580 provides that every "air carrier" shall file with
the Board for approval a copy of any agreement affecting "air
transportation."" Section 414 of the Act gives the CAB power to
relieve any person affected by an order made pursuant to section
8 The denial of the motion was certified for interlocutory appeal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 5 1292(b) (1951) on the ground that a controlling question of law
was involved and an immediate appeal might materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation. Id. at 769.
7Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301
et seq. (1970), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
[hereinafter sometimes cited in text as "the Act"].
8 The Second Circuit held, alternatively, that even if the contracting parties
were "air carriers", primary jurisdiction was not in the CAB, since the activities
complained of were not even "arguably lawful" under the regulatory statute. This
alternative holding, essentially a reiteration of traditional reasons courts have
given for rejecting the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in these circumstances,
rests ultimately on a finding that the agreements in question had never been passed
on by the CAB and were therefore not even "arguably approved." 470 F.2d at
773-74. Cf'. note 4 supra.
"See note 15 infra, and corresponding text, for the definition of "air carrier."
1049 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (1970):
Every air carrier shall file with the Board a true copy . . . of every
contract or agreement . . . affecting air transportation and in force
on the effective date of this section or hereafter entered into, or any
modification or cancellation thereof, between such air carrier and
any other air carrier, foreign air carrier, or other carrier for pooling
or apportioning earnings, losses, traffic, service, or equipment, or
relating to the establishment of transportation rates, fares, charges,
or classifications, or for preserving and improving safety, economy,
and efficiency of operation, or for controlling, regulating, preventing, or otherwise eliminating destructive, oppressive, or wasteful
competition, . . . or for other cooperative working arrangements.
1149 U.S.C. § 1301(10) (1970):
"Air transportation" means interstate, overseas, or foreign air transportation or the transportation of mail by aircraft.
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412 from the operation of the anti-trust laws "insofar as may be
necessary to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by such order."'" The Second Circuit in Breen
considered the relationship between these two sections of the Act
to be that section 414 does not become operative unless an agreement executed by an actual "air carrier" has been submitted and
approved as required by section 412." Therefore, the power of
the CAB to immunize from anti-trust liability was strictly limited
to instances when the underlying agreement is in fact executed by
a person falling within the statutory definition of "air carrier."
According to the Second Circuit, it follows that these provisions
did not apply to the Ryd-Air agreement or contract because none
of the parties were within the statutory definition.'
Section 101 (3) of the Federal Aviation Act defines "air carrier"
as "any citizen of the United States who undertakes, whether directly or indirectly ...to engage in air transportation."" The court
in Breen conceded that this definition was too vague to be of much
assistance." There was, however, nothing in the activities of the
contracting parties to indicate that they were undertaking to engage
in air transportation; ACI was formed for the ".... limited purpose
of acting as [the airlines'] agent in providing terminal and cartage
services. ... "" Similarly, Ryder System's business was ground trans"49

U.S.C. 5 1384 (1970):

Any person affected by any order made under sections 1378, 1379,
or 1382 of this title shall be, and is hereby, relieved from the operations of the "antitrust laws", as designated in section 12 of Title
15, and of all other restraints or prohibitions of law, insofar as may
be necessary to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by such order.
13470 F.2d at 771 n.2: "It is clear under Section 412 of the Act . . . that

the Board can only approve and thereby immunize agreements to which 'air
carriers' are parties."

14 1d. at 771.
1549 U.S.C. § 1301(3):

"Air carrier" means any citizen of the United States who undertakes, whether directly or indirectly or by a lease or any other ar-

rangement, to engage in air transportation: Provided, That the
Board may by order relieve air carriers who are not directly engaged in the operation of aircraft in air transportation from the provisions of this chapter to the extent and for such periods as may be
in the public interest.
16470 F.2d at 771.
17Id. at 771-72. ACI, incorporated as a joint venture by its member airlines,
was to act as the agent of those airlines in providing the specified services. ACI
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portation and ACI's contract with Ryd-Air simply stated that
Ryd-Air would provide ground transportation for freight that
ACI's member airlines had undertaken to carry by air.18
The statutory definition of "air carrier" has been frequently
considered in both administrative' and judicial"0 proceedings. The
trend in these decisions has been toward the development of a
broad and flexible interpretation of the statutory language. This is
supported by the congressional intent to give the CAB broad powers
over the air transportation industry, which intent would have been
frustrated if the courts and the CAB were inclined to view the
statutory provisions narrowly." The House Report on the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938" suggests that a narrow construction of
the Act's terms was not contemplated:
It is the purpose of this legislation to coordinate in a single independent agency all of the existing functions of the Federal Government with respect to civil aeronautics, and, in addition, to authorize the new agency to perform certain new regulatory functions
which are designed to stabilize the air transportation industry in the
United States."
Additionally, the Civil Aeronautics Board has in practice asserted
was created to provide pick-up and delivery (cartage) and terminal services directly, or could by contract engage other parties to perform those services. The
airlines apparently relied wholly on ACI to make these arrangements for their
air freight trade, and did not deal directly with the other parties with whom ACI
contracted. See Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C.A.B. 473, 484-85 (1948).
440 F.2d at 772.
"See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity, 2 C.A.B. 531, 536 (1941); Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C.A.B.
473 (1948).
0See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. CAB, 345 F.2d 445 (D.C.Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
1See, e.g., 86 CONG. REC. 6028-29 (1940). See also Hearings on S.3880
Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Hearings on H.R. 12616 Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958) (companion bill to S.3880).
2 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973, re-enacted as Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1970).
On the extent to which the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was re-enacted in the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, see 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess., at 3752 (1958) (legislative history).
2"H.R. REP. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938); see also Pan American
World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 300-04 (1963); cf. Hughes Tool
Co. v. TWA, 409 U.S. 363, 385 (1973).
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its control over all activities that might affect the stability of air
carriers and the ability of air carriers to provide air transportation.' In response to recent pressure from the airlines to allow
subsidiarization and diversification, the Board has repeatedly emphasized that it has power to place strict controls on all activities
of air carriers and their affiliates, including activities not directly
related to air transportation.' The CAB takes the position that
its power extends to any arrangement or relationship that affects
air commerce and persons involved therein, whether directly or
indirectly, and is by no means limited to activities closely related
to the actual operation of aircraft. 6
In numerous instances the CAB and the courts have interpreted
the term "air carrier" to include various classes of persons engaged
in many different phases of air commerce other than the scheduled
or "direct" carriers and have coined appropriate terms, generally
based on the statutory designation, to describe these persons.
These amplifications of the statutory definition fall generally into
two categories: (i) those that are applied to persons who actually
operate aircraft, e.g., the "supplemental" or "irregular" air carriers;"' and (ii) those applied to persons who, though not directly
engaged in the operation of aircraft, hold themselves out to the
public as providing air transportation by arrangement with a scheduled or charter carrier. Persons in this latter category are generally
classified as "indirect air carriers" or "air freight forwarders."'
24Cf. Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge, Air Carrier Reorganization Investigation, CAB Docket 24283 et al. (Aug. 27, 1973). [hereinafter referred to as "Initial Decision"].
2" Id.
21 Initial Decision at 6-10. Cf. Pan American World Airways v. United States,
371 U.S. 296 (1963). The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice takes
the position, however, that while the doctrine of Pan American World Airways
v. United States, supra, recognizes that CAB economic jurisdiction
"... extends beyond those areas specifically enumerated in the
Federal Aviation Act to include those activities and relationships
of an air carrier that directly affect its ability to provide air trans-

portation, . . ."

this jurisdiction does not include air carrier activities incidental or unrelated to
air transportation. The Justice Department insists that control over such areas
rests with it and the Federal Trade Commission. Initial Decision at 11. At least

one air carrier agrees. Id. at 18 (statement of position of Flying Tiger Line).
21See, e.g., American Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 365 F.2d 939, 940 (D.C. Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
21See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity, 2 C.A.B. 531, 536 (1941).
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The "irregular" or "supplemental"' carriers are distinguished
from the scheduled carriers for convenience and administrative
purposes. Their traditional function has been to supplement, largely
through charters, services provided by the scheduled airlines."
There is no doubt, however, that they are "air carriers" and subject to the CAB's regulatory powers since they do in fact operate
aircraft and thereby engage directly in air transportation.
The second category, that of the so-called "indirect" air carriers, is not as clearly defined; it encompasses at present two groups.
This designation was originally applied to "air freight forwarders,""1
who hold themselves out to the public as providing air carriage
for freight; the actual carriage, however, is accomplished by aircraft operated by the scheduled airlines. For many years, the terms
"air freight forwarder" and "indirect air carrier" were essentially
synonymous. More recently, the latter term has been perceived to
be broader and has been applied to other persons having the same
type of indirect relationship to air transportation as the freight
forwarders. These persons are for the most part travel agents and
travel clubs that do not act exclusively as the agents of any particular airline, but whose customers or members "are well aware
that transportation which is being offered will subsequently be
provided by an airline pursuant to agreements with such [travel
agent]. . .. .32
The determination that a person, whether travel agent or freight
forwarder, is an "indirect air carrier" and therefore an "air carrier"
within the meaning of the Federal Aviation Act rests upon the
fact of that person's representation to the public that air trans2'The terms "irregular air carrier" and "supplemental air carrier" are generally used interchangeably. A 1972 amendment to the Federal Aviation Act
added a definition of "supplemental air carrier," 49 U.S.C. § 1301(33) (Supp.

1972):

"Supplemental air carrier" means an air carrier holding a certificate
of public convenience and necessity authorizing it to engage in sup-

plemental air transportation.
"American Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 365 F.2d 939, 940 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
1 See

cases cited note 19 supra. The term seems to have been first applied to

Railway Express Agency, Inc.
"Travel Agents Malpractice Action Corps. v. Royal Cultural Society, Inc.,
118 N.J. Super. 184, 287 A.2d 4, 10 (1972). See also Monarch Travel Services,
Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1972), noted in
39 J. AIR L. & CoM. 463 (1973).
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portation can or will be provided, although the actual transportation will be on aircraft operated by a scheduled or supplemental
carrier. 3 Implicit in this determination is the conclusion that the
indirect carrier, though not engaged in the actual operation of
aircraft, nonetheless has a sufficient relationship to air transportation to warrant subjecting that person to the regulatory power of
the CAB. Although it is arguably the degree of relationship to air
commerce and the effect thereon which should be determinative, in
practice, the question of public representation is the standard that
has been applied, possibly because it is more susceptible of proof
and therefore more judicially manageable.
In light of this, it is difficult to place ACI and Ryd-Air into the
category of "indirect" carriers insofar as the "public representation" standard is considered to be controlling. Even conceding that
their activities had some effect on air transportation, the court
in Breen could not embark upon an inquiry into whether that
effect was great enough to require CAB regulation without applying a new standard. The Second Circuit did not explicitly consider
the question, but implicit in the finding that the parties to the
agreement and contract were not "air carriers" is the conclusion
that at least they did not fall within one of the accepted versions
of the statutory definition. The holding in Breen thus serves to
emphasize a line drawn between "indirect air carriers" and persons
who merely provide ancillary services incidental to carriage by
air, notwithstanding the extent to which those services might affect
air commerce. The case also indicates an unwillingness on the
part of the Second Circuit to extend the "air carrier" definition
beyond already broad limits; in fact, Breen may be viewed as a
retreat from the proposition that CAB regulatory power under the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is sufficiently broad to encompass
any and all activities of air carriers, even when conducted by agents
and affiliates like ACI. This proposition has been accepted,' but
the Second Circuit refused to give its imprimatur to a further
broadening of the definition, at least under these circumstances,
since ACI and Ryd-Air were only involved in providing pick-up
and delivery services for the airlines' own air freight trade. Neither
33Id. Cf. Railway Express Agency, Certificate of Public Convenience
and
Necessity, 2 C.A.B. 531, 536 (1941).
34See note 26 supra.
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party operated any aircraft and public representation that defendants would provide air transportation was lacking; therefore, there

was no compelling reason to commit the parties to a regulatory
scheme predicated on one or the other of these two factors insofar
as the "air carrier" definition is determinative."

In reaching its conclusion, however, the Second Circuit also had
to consider defendants' contention that the airlines' that formed
ACI had, as disclosed principals, become parties to the agreements

made by ACI acting as their agent.'

Relying on common-law

agency principles," the court in Breen pointed out that the airlines,
as principals, could only become parties by ratification of the
agreements and that ratification could occur only when the principal, having full knowledge of all material facts, manifests an
intention to ratify. On this point, the Second Circuit held flatly
that the ACI-airline relationship and the mere fact that the airlines
had dealt with Ryd-Air were "insufficient as a matter of law to
constitute a ratification of the creation ...of Ryd-Air or of the

contract.., with Ryd-Air." Additionally, the circuit court emphasized that the agreement creating Ryd-Air did not contain any
"Perhaps the broadest view that any court has taken with respect to the statutory definition of "air carrier" is that of a federal district court in United States
v. City of Montgomery, 201 F. Supp. 590 (M.D. Ala. 1962), where a city operating an airport was found to be an "air carrier" for purposes of applying the
nondiscrimination provision of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970):
No air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage to any particular person, port, locality, or
description of traffic in air transportation in any respect whatsoever
or subject any particular person, port, locality, or description of
traffic in air transportation to any unjust discrimination or any unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
The case involved racial discrimination in terminal facilities at an airport in
Montgomery, Alabama. The district court held flatly that the City of Montgomery
was an "air carrier" within the meaning of the Act so as to bring the city within
the provisions of Section 1374(b). The decision, which was not appealed, is
probably only explicable in the light of the civil-rights fervor of the early Sixties;
to the extent it construes the "air carrier" definition of section 1301(3) it should
be considered an aberration.
" Defendants' position was that even if ACI and Ryd-Air were found to be
outside the statutory definition, section 414 should nevertheless apply, since ACI's
principals were, beyond question, "air carriers" by any definition. 470 F.2d at 772.
37 Id.
"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 91, 93-100 (1957), cited by
the Second Circuit in Breen, 470 F.2d at 773. Cf. 2A C.J.S. Agency § 56, 63,
73 (1972).
" 470 F.2d at 773.
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indication that ACI was acting on behalf of the airlines' and there
was nothing in the airlines' 1947 agreement concerning ACI indicating that they had authorizd ACI to form a new corporation."'
This finding stresses form over substance, however, since nine of
the eleven ACI directors were in fact officers of member airlines"
and ACI's operations seem to have been an integral part of the
airlines' air freight business. ' Furthermore, by dealing with Ryd-Air
and accepting the benefits of the arrangement, the airlines, under
equally familiar principles of agency law, might have been estopped
to deny their approval of the agreements had they been made parties to the suit." The Second Circuit nevertheless found nothing
in the record to indicate "that the airlines knew the material facts
involved in the formation of Ryd-Air or that they communicated
a desire to ratify its formation." This apparent refusal to look
beyond appearances to reality can only be explained as a judicial
reluctance to extend the CAB's antitrust immunity power to carriers' agents and affiliates like ACI whose direct involvement in
air commerce is slight. The implication of Breen is that despite
the previous broad application of the regulatory statute, there is
nonetheless a line of demarcation beyond which the relationship
to air transportation becomes sufficiently attenuated, even if only
in form, that the persons involved cannot properly be considered
even "indirect air carriers" and are therefore neither subject to
nor sheltered by the powers of the CAB. This is true despite the
fact that in substance the persons in question may be created by
and agents of "air carriers" within the meaning of the Federal
40

Id. at 772. The cartage contract with Ryd-Air did contain the words "as
agent for and on behalf of the Air Carriers," as had all prior ACI cartage contracts.
"4Id. at 774 n.6. In fact, the order approving the 1947 agreement stipulated
that ACI was not to sign any agreement without disclosing its relationship with
the airlines. See CAB Order No. E-1086 (Dec. 31, 1947).

"See WORLD AVIATION DIRECTORY 892 (Summer 1972).
43 The relationship between the airlines and ACI is discussed in the Air Freight
Forwarder Case, 9 C.A.B. 473, 484-85 (1948). It is interesting to note that ACI
had authority to revoke or terminate any airline contract or agreement with Railway Express Agency, itself a creation of the airlines, without prior airline approval.
Id. at 484.
"See 2A C.J.S. Agency § 60 (1972); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 103 (1957).
45470

F.2d at 773.
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Aviation Act and despite enjoyment by the air carriers of the
benefits of the particular arrangement.
Conceding that the public interest may require that regulation
of air carrier competition be entrusted to the Civil Aeronautics
Board, the standards of competition enjoyed by the airlines may
not be desirable in all areas in which the airlines have an interest.
Nor is it clear that the standards applicable to the air transportation activities of air carriers with respect to economic regulation
could be appropriately imposed on more diversified aspects of the
airline companies' business. With increasing participation by the
airlines in the provision of terminal facilities and, for example,
other diverse services like airport parking, ground transportation
for passengers and freight, and both in-flight and terminal food
service, the questions posed in Breen may continue to arise. When
air carriers begin to take on a broader role, whether on their own
behalf or through affiliates created for that purpose, in providing
services that are ancillary but incidental to air transportation, it
becomes necessary to determine when and to what extent this
involvement will be sheltered by CAB power to regulate competition and immunize from antitrust liability. The Second Circuit's
decision in Breen has drawn a line beyond which the CAB lacks
power to immunize the airlines or their affiliates from liability for
interference with competitive patterns established for non-aviation
industries. Whether the CAB will recognize this limitation in its
own proceedings, however, has not been determined, since the
Board has taken the position that its regulatory authority extends
to all air carrier activities that have an effect on air commerce,
whether direct or indirect. 6 Insofar as Breen represents a judicial
refusal to broaden the statutory definition of "air carrier" beyond
already wide limits, there is at least a starting point from which
41 See note 26 supra. This is not to say that the CAB might have approved
the Ryd-Air agreement. In fact, ACI and its member airlines had already run
afoul of the Board's anti-trust policies. One of the conditions imposed by the order

approving the 1947 reactivation agreement was that other certified air carriers,
besides those which formed ACI, be allowed to participate as a matter of right.
See CAB Order No. E-1086, supra notes 1, 39. Two of the member airlines,
Eastern and United, filed petitions asking that the condition be removed. The
Board denied the petitions, stating that it could not ignore the policy of the antitrust laws in considering these matters even though it was not bound by them,
and section 412 notwithstanding. Agreement Establishing Air Cargo, Inc., Peti-

tions of Eastern Air Lines, Inc., and United Air Lines, Inc., for Reconsideration, 9
C.A.B. 468, 470-72 (1948).
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to make a distinction between pure air carrier activites, which
properly are subject to CAB control, and airline activities in other
areas outside the ambit of CAB expertise which are not fit for the
exercise of CAB regulatory and immunization powers.
Merrick C. Walton

AIR TRANSPORTATION-CHATER

TRAVEL-An

Organi-

zation Functioning as an Air Carrier Should be Treated as One
Regardless of the Label it Applies to its Activities. Monarch
Travel Services, Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d
552 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 967 (1973).
Monarch Travel Services brought suit in federal court seeking
to enjoin Associated Cultural Clubs (ACCI) from arranging charter flights between Southern California and Europe. Monarch, who
lost commissions from clients who were diverted by ACCI's competition, alleged that ACCI was violating section 1371(a) of the
Federal Aviation Act by engaging in "air transportation" without
a certificate or exemption from the Civil Aeronautics Board.! The
district court found that since ACCI solicited members of the
general public to purchase tickets on the flights it arranged, it was
only nominally a social club; the organization's real purpose was
the selling of tours and air transportation. Therefore, ACCI was
found to be operating as an "indirect air carrier" without a certificate or exemption from the CAB.' Held, affirmed: An organi'49 U.S.C. S 1371(a) (1970) provides:
No air carrier shall engage in any air transportation unless there is
in force a certificate issued by the Board authorizing such air carrier
to engage in such transportation.
'Monarch Travel Services, Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d
552-54 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 967 (1973). Defendants raised
two theories on appeal that will not be discussed. First, Monarch Travel Services,
Inc. did not have standing to maintain the suit. The court in Monarch ruled

that plaintiffs had standing to sue as "any party in interest" within the meaning of
49 U.S.C. S 1487(a) (1970) which provides:
[I]n the case of a violation of section 1371(a) of this title,
any party in interest may apply to the district court of the United
States . . . and such court shall have jurisdiction to enforce obedi-

ence thereto by a writ of injunction or other process . . .restraining such person . . . from further violation of such provision of
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zation functioning as an air carrier should be treated as one regardless of the label it applies to its business. Monarch Travel Services,
Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 967 (1973).
The Ninth Circuit in Monarch reasoned that ACCI had acted
in violation of section 1371 (a) because it was an "indirect air carrier" without a certificate or exemption from the Civil Aeronautics
Board. An "air carrier" is defined within the Federal Aviation
Act as "any citizen who undertakes, whether directly or indirectly,
or by lease or any other arrangement, to engage in air transportation. . . ." The Ninth Circuit concluded that regardless of the
label ACCI applied to its activities, the organization was in the
transportation business and thus was an "indirect air carrier."'
The holding in Monarch is supported by previous interpretations
of the term "indirect air carrier" made by the courts and the CAB.
The term was defined as early as 1941 by the CAB in the Railway
Express Agency, Grandfather Certificate case' when the CAB
specifically recognized that "indirect air carriers" were a distinct
class of carriers under the Federal Aviation Act. The Board defined "indirect air carriage" as those activities undertaken indirectly, by lease or through some other arrangement, that result in
the transportation of persons, property or mail. The Railway Express Agency was found to be within this classification and was
required to have a certificate or exemption before conducting its
air freight forwarding operations! Additionally, the CAB stated
that it viewed the use of the term "indirectly" in the definition of
"air carrier" as a studied effort to make the scope of the definition
extremely broad.!
this chapter . . . (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs having suffered economic loss because of the diversion of clients to
ACCI were "any party in interest." 466 F.2d at 552, 554; Northeast Airlines, Inc.

v. Nationwide Charters and Conventions, Inc., 413 F.2d 335 (1st Cir. 1969).
Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. United
States, 400 U.S. 45, 46 (1970); Association of Data Processing Services Organi-

zations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S, 150, 152 (1970). Secondly, defendants argued
that the charter regulations were unconstitutional restrictions on the right to
travel. The Ninth Circuit summarily dismissed this argument.
'49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1970).
4 466 F.2d at 554.
3 Railroad Express Agency, Grandfather Certificate, 2 C.A.B. 531, 536 (1941).
'Id.
' Id. at 536-37.
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A Ninth Circuit decision, Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. CAB,'
which was relied on by the court in Monarch, illustrates the broad
interpretation the courts have given to the term "indirect air carrier." In Las Vegas Hacienda, the term was held to encompass
a resort hotel selling package tours that included "free" flights to
Las Vegas. The tours were sold at a price less than the cost of
air fare for flights sold by certified air carriers. It was also found
that many people purchased the tours merely to obtain low-cost
transportation to Las Vegas.! In affirming the decision of the CAB
that the hotel was acting as an "indirect air carrier," the court in
Las Vegas Hacienda approved the objective test applied by the
Board that relied "upon what the carrier actually [did] rather than
upon the label which the carrier attache[d] to its activity or the
purpose which motivate[d] it.""
In addition to Las Vegas Hacienda, the Ninth Circuit relied
heavily on two CAB orders with fact situations similar to those
in the Monarch case in which the Board concluded that the "social
clubs" involved were engaged in "indirect air carriage" without
CAB approval." The number of members in the clubs involved in
the CAB decisions illustrates the extent to which these organizations were engaged in "indirect air transportation." In one of the
CAB's enforcement proceedings," the Board found there to be a
network of organizations with reciprocal membership lists that,
combined, contained the names of over 50,000 members. In the
other enforcement proceeding,' " the association of clubs listed approximately 30,000 members. This massive non-compliance with
CAB regulations emphasizes the need for the strict analysis used
in Monarch."'
'298 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1962).
'Id. at 434-35.
"Id. at 434 (emphasis added). See M & R Investment Co. v. CAB, 308 F.2d
49 (9th Cir. 1962), where "free" flights were included in package tours sold by
a hotel. Accord Alaska Air Transport, Inc. v. Alaska Airplane Charter Co., 72
F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Alas. 1947). See also United States v. California, 297
U.S. 175, 181 (1936).
"Educational Student Exchange Program, Inc. Enforcement Proceeding, CAB
Order 71-5-39 (May 10, 1971); United European American Club Enforcement
Proceeding, CAB Order 71-2-33 (Feb. 5, 1971).
'2 CAB Order 71-2-33 (Feb. 5, 1971).
"CAB Order 71-5-39 (May 10, 1971).
"' The New York Times has noted that the rules regarding six months membership in the organization are openly flouted and that a huge illegal travel
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In determining an organization's status as an "indirect carrier,"
two principal factors have guided the courts and the CAB in their
decisions: (i) whether the organization is "holding out to the
public" the availability of air transportation and (ii) whether the
organization has respected the CAB regulations requiring that
passengers on a club charter flight have some "prior affinity."
The first factor, whether the organization is "holding out" to
the public the availability of air transportation, is exemplified in
Las Vegas Hacienda, in which the court concluded:
[T]he illegality of the uncertified flights arose from the holding out
(primarily through advertising, ticket sales, and similar activities)
that the flights were available to the general public for compensation or hire."
Defendant "social clubs" in the Monarch case and the CAB enforcement proceedings also solicited members of the public for
the flights they arranged. 6 According to CAB rules regarding
authorized club charters, solicitation of the general public is prohibited." Furthermore, the Board has stated that a cardinal principle of the 1956 charter policy is the prohibition of solicitation
of the general public."8 Therefore, it is apparent that whether an
organization is "holding out to the public" the availability of
air transportation is an important consideration in determining
whether its activities constitute "indirect air carriage."
The second factor given important consideration in determining
whether an organization's activities are within the realm of "indirect air carriage" is whether the organization has respected the
CAB regulations requiring that passengers on a club charter flight
have some "prior affinity." As defined by the Board, "prior affinity"
industry has sprung up. N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1971, at 66, col. 1 (city ed.). An
example of the abuses of the charter rules and the problems that can result from
these abuses was apparent in August, 1971, when 300 young Americans, who had
joined a fictitious social club, were stranded in Europe when their return flight
tickets were not honored because the airlines had not been paid for the return
flight. N. Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1971, at 1, col. 3.
"See Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. CAB, 298 F.2d 430, 440 (9th Cir. 1962);
Joiner Investment Case, 12 C.A.B. 879 (1951); Pacific Northern Airlines v.
Alaska Airlines, 80 F. Supp. 592 (D. Alas. 1948); Southeast Aviation, Inc. Enforcement Proceeding, 32 C.A.B. 1281, 1282 (1961).
16466 F.2d at 553; CAB Order 71-5-39 at 3 (May 10, 1971); CAB Order
71-2-33 at 2 (Feb. 5, 1971).
17 14 C.F.R. § 207.40(b) (1973).
18Slick Airways, Exemption, 25 C.A.B. 763, 764 (1957).
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means that the passengers on the charter flight must be bona fide
members of the organization, club or other entity for at least six
months prior to the flight and that the members must not join
"merely to participate in the charter as the result of solicitation
of the general public.... 1 This rule was not observed by defendant ACCI nor was it heeded by the organizations involved in the
CAB enforcement proceedings." Principally as a result of ACCI's
solicitation of the general public and its failure to follow the "prior
affinity" requirement, the Ninth Circuit in Monarch held that
ACCI was an "indirect air carrier."'"
Although the decision in Monarch does not expand the interpretation of "indirect air carrier" beyond the bounds set in cases
like Las Vegas Hacienda, it is significant when analyzed in light of
other recent developments in the charter area. In September of
1972, the CAB announced a new alternative charter classification
called "Travel Group Charters" (TGC) that will allow members
of the public with no "prior affinity" to charter flights. While preserving the old "prior affinity" charter regulations for social clubs,
the CAB enacted the TGC class for the general public on an experimental basis.' Under this new classification, members of the
public with no prior association may engage in a joint undertaking
to charter an aircraft for their own transportation on a round-trip
basis, sharing equally in the cost of the flight.2 ' The charters are
to be formed by "travel group charter organizers" who will be
classified as "indirect air carriers" and, as such, subject to CAB
29

See note 17 supra.

"See

note 16 supra.

466 F.2d at 554.
2237 Fed. Reg. 20808 (1972); 14 C.F.R. § 372(a) (1972). Several important
provisions of the "Travel Group Charter" classification are: (i) the charter must
21

be for forty or more seats; (ii) the charter flight must be on a round trip basis;

(iii) a minimum duration time of seven days is required for North American
Charters; (iv) the transportation must be by a direct air carrier, either scheduled
or supplemental, domestic or foreign; (v) a minimum three month lead time
for filing charter contracts and a list of passengers is required and; (vi) there
is no prohibition against advertising.
2 14 C.F.R. § 372a.5 (1973). The Board provided that the regulations authorizing TGC would terminate on December 31, 1975. The success of the new

classification will be determined at that point. 37 Fed. Reg. 20809 (1972). In
a later ruling, the Board announced that it would not suspend the prior affinity
charter rules for social clubs during the TGC experiment. 38 Fed. Reg. 16917
(1973).
" 14 C.F.R. S 372a.5 (1973).
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regulation." Any "citizen of the United States" as defined by section 101 (13) of the Federal Aviation Act2e may organize a TGC as
long as he complies with certain regulations prescribed for the
public's safety. While these regulations do not require the charter
organizer to receive certification from the CAB, the organizer must
furnish and file with the Board a surety bond, a copy of the proposed contract with the charter participants, samples of the promotional material, a post-flight accounting report and other documents that will assure the Board that the charter will be financially
sound.!"
The CAB gave two reasons for adopting the TGC classification.
The Board was concerned that the "prior affinity" rules discriminated against members of the public not belonging to qualified
organizations, and in addition, that the "prior affinity" rules had
proven extremely difficult to enforce. The Board stated that the
desire for low-cost charter transportation was being satisfied by
illegal charters and that the consumers' needs should be met in a
lawful manner."6 Thus, as a result of the CAB's inability to adequately enforce the "prior affinity" requirement, the TGC class was
created to legalize the actions of those persons who violated the
"prior affinity" rules by participation in illegal charters. The validity of the TGC class was upheld in a District of Columbia Circuit
decision, Saturn Airways, Inc. v. CAB,"' in which the court noted
the tremendous difficulties experienced in enforcing the "prior affinity" rules and approved the CAB's efforts to ease the restrictions
on charter travel. The circuit court stated in support of the new
classification that the actions of the Board in the area of charter
air travel had provided for the steady growth of the air transportation system and that the public was the primary benefactor."
While the Board has liberalized its rules on charter travel, the
decision in Monarch should help to insure that the new TGC rules
37 Fed. Reg. 20815 (1972).
"""Citizen of the United States" is defined by the Federal Aviation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1301(13) (1970), as "an individual who is a citizen of the United
States . . . or (b) a partnership . . . or (c) a corporation or association created
or organized under the laws of the United States or of any state.

'T See 14 C.F.R. § 372a.20-.31 (1973).
2837 Fed. Reg. 20808 (1972).

2 12 Av. L. REP. 17,985 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
0

1d.
I at 17990.

1973]

CASE NOTES

will be respected. In Monarch, the United States filed a brief
amicus curiae in support of the district court's finding that ACCI
was an "indirect air carrier."'" This action, coupled with the fact
that the Monarch decision and the new TGC class were announced
only twelve days apart," may be interpreted as a warning that
while the charter rules may have changed, strict adherence to these
rules is still required.
When viewed in conjunction, Monarch and the TGC class
provide the CAB with tools for more effective charter regulation.
By removing the "prior affinity" requirements, the Board has made
it easier for charters to operate legally; this will reduce the public
appeal for illegal charters. The analysis used by the Ninth Circuit
in Monarch in the context of the "prior affinity" charters will now
be applied in the new context of the TGC classification. According
to the decision in Monarch, anyone who arranges charter flights
will be classified as an "indirect air carrier" and will be subject
to the operational requirements of the TGC rules which are designed for the public's protection. The success of the TGC will
depend upon how well the new classification can provide safe,
efficient, and low-cost charter travel. Effective regulation as exemplified by the Ninth Circuit in Monarch will aid the tremendous
expansion in charter travel3 by insuring that the growth is regulated for the public's benefit.
Paul W. Gertz

81466 F.2d at 553.
"Monarch was decided on September 15, 1972 and TGC was announced on
September 27, 1972. 466 F.2d 552; 37 Fed. Reg. 10808.
"See CAB UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL AIR CHARTER PASSENGER MOVEMENTS, 1968-1970 (October 1971); see generally 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 441, 447
(1972).
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